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ANTI-HOARDING LAWS: A STOCK CONDEMNATION RE-ASSAYED 
Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey c. Williams 
Yale University and Brandeis University 
ABSTRACT 
Economists have regarded anti-hoarding laws as irrational 
reactions to non-existent monopoly in the storage of grain. In this 
paper, we show that anti-hoarding laws cannot be rationally directed 
against a monopolistic storer, for he will always store less, not more, 
than would be stored under competition. But seemingly perverse competitive 
storage, in the form of excessive stockholding, can arise when a price 
ceiling distorts the market. Additional public storage exacerbates this 
perverse private behavior, and may even induce behavior that appears to 
be active market manipulation. Under such circumstances, anti-hoarding 
laws can be a desirable second-best policy. 
*ANTI-HOARDING LAWS: A STOCK CONDEMNATION RE-ASSAYED 
Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey c. Williams 
Yale University and Brandeis University 
One of the most ancient and persistent concerns of public policy 
has been regulation of traders involved in the purchase, storage, and 
resale of grain. In England up to the seventeenth century, for example, 
purchase of grain with the intention of resale in the same market at a later 
date was commonly forbidden, or allowed only when the price was below a 
1specified level. In modern times anti-hoarding laws have been enforced 
frequently in periods of scarcity. Over the last forty years in India and 
Pakistan, for example, public authorities have repeatedly taken measures 
against hoarding. 2 
Economists have inferred that anti-hoarding laws are directed 
against monopoly in the handling of grain, or more specifically, against 
price-manipulating behavior by private starers who, by withholding excessive 
amounts of grain, decrease supply below its socially optimal level. Adam 
Smith (1784), for one, accepts that these laws are concerned with 
monopoly. One argument he makes against them is that corn merchants are 
too n\DDerous to collude, although this argument is disputed by Rashid 
(1980) who offers historical evidence to the contrary. Smith, however, 
further argues that, even if storage is monopolized, excessive hoarding 
will not occur. He reasons that "the corn merchant himself is likely to 
suffer the most by this excess of avarice••• from the quantity of corn 
which it necessarily leaves upon his hands in the end of the season, and 
which, if the next season happens to prove favourable, he must always sell 
for a much lower price than he might otherwise have had" (Vol. 2, p. 293). 
2 
Satisfied anti-hoarding laws are not justified as an attack against storage 
monopoly, he concludes that "The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling 
may be compared to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft" (Vol. 2, 
p. 309). 
In this paper we re-examine the case for anti-hoarding laws. We 
use a stochastic dynamic programming approach to confirm that a storage 
monopolist will not withhold grain excessively, though he will decrease 
consumption in times of scarcity. But anti-hoarding laws might have other 
justifications. In fact, we show that anti-hoardings laws may be socially 
desirable when price ceilings are imposed on the grain trade, as they 
frequently have. been. 
3 Price ceilings and related measures can induce 
evencompetitive starers to withhold their grain during the worst shortages, 
and to exhibit seemingly manipulative behavior. 
1. Competitive Storage 
In this analysis we assume a closed economy with a storable connnodity 
subject to a random disturbance in production. Consider first the case 
where starers are risk-neutral atomistic price-takers with rational 
expectations. Profit-maximizing storage behavior is an inherently inter­
temporal problem because storage, like other forms of investment, connects 
one period with the next. In an undistorted economy with infinite 
horizon, the necessary conditions for competitive storage, which are also 




P + K' = (1 + r)-l E [P ] , 
t t t+l 
3 
where Et is the expectational operator conditional on the information 
available at time t, r is the interest rate, and K' is the net 
marginal cost of storage. Price Pt is given by the inverse consumption 
demand function 
(2) , P' < 0 
where ht is the harvest and is the amount stored from period t to 
period t+l • 
Implicit in these conditions is a function relating competitive 
storage to the amount available: 
(3) , 
where the amount available, It, is given by 
(4) 
The implications of competitive storage have been examined by Wright and 
Williams (1982a), who use numerical methods to derive Et[Pt+l] as a 
Cfunction of St, and thereby derive the storage behavior for zero and 
positive supply elasticities.
5 
2. Monopolistic Storage 
In most agricultural markets the number of producers is large. In 
contrast, the market for the supply of storage services may be highly 
concentrated, in which case storers might try to extract some supernormal 
profits from their operations. When there is only one storer, or when 
cooperation is perfect, the limiting case of a storage monopoly occurs. 
If it existed, would such a monopoly justify an anti-hoarding law? 
4 
In discussing the behavior of the storage monopolist, it is 
as if he sells all his stock and then rebuys theconvenient to proceEd 
amount he wants to store till the next period. (Handling costs and 
shrinkage are ignored.) Expected monopoly profits in the infinite horizon 
case·are given by 
(5) 
An expected-profit maximizing 110nopolist must consider that each additional 
unit stored depresses his retum on preceding units and that the opportunity 
cost of each additional unit put into store is the marginal expenditure, 
which of course will be higher than the price. A monopolist, with 
rational expectations, will also recognize the effects of his current 
actions on his stream of future profits. The more he stores this period, 
the greater will be the availability and the larger will be his profits next 
period. The prospect for greater storage next period will in turn lead to 
higher expected profits in even more distant in even more distant periods. 
Thus a monopolistic storer follows the arbitrage conditions: 
' 
(6) 
MX + K't • ' 




plus the effect on 
aEt[n(st+1>1 
expected future profits,----------, and ast 
MXt is 
marginal expenditure, • Using a numerical approach analogous to 
that used to derive as a function of in the competitive 
. __ ,,. .-,..:.. 
5 
as functions of From 
m
these, the amount stored by the monopolist, St, is derived as a function 
of the amount available: 
(7) , 
At first glance, it might not be clear why a monopolist is concerned 
with marginal expenditure in period t rather than marginal revenue. If 
his problem were the allocation of total supply among p'eriods, he would 
in fact be concemed with marginal revenue in the current period. But if 
one party controlled all distribution such that consumers could buy only 
from him, it is by no means obvious that he would store anythin~ at all. 
When the demand curve is inelastic over the relevant range of supply, a 
monopolist over distribution will want to restrict supply to an infinitesimal 
amount or to an amount where demand becomes elastic.
6 
He would not incur 
additional charges to store the crop but would destroy it. A monopolist 
over distribution would store only when be was somehow constrained from 
destroying supplies, although a more plausible reaction would be for him 
to maneuver to restrict production. If the disturbance in production is 
small, the monopolist will rationally store only if consumption demand is 
locally elastic, which is surely not the case for staple foodstuffs. 
(In any case, the more elastic the demand, the less role there is for 
storage, even under competition.) 
Because a monopolist over distribution is most likely to be 
destroying crops or restricting plantings, the likely legal response 
would be anti-destruction laws and laws against limiting production. 
If anti-hoarding laws are directed against some form of monopoly, the 
...._--·:·...: .. 
6 
monopoly power must be over only storage, not over the entire system of 
distribution. A storage monopolist competes in the market for current 
consumption. Hence he pays attention to the marginal expenditure on what 
he puts into store, as seen in equation (6). 
3. Comparison of Competitive and Monopolistic Storage Behavior 
The storage rules for both competition and monopoly depend in 
practice on the particular demand curve. the supply elasticity, the 
variability of the harvest, the interest rate, and storage costs. An 
important fact about real-world grain storage is that the net marginal 
cost of storage is not linear, and more important, becomes negative 
as storage falls below medium levels. Working (1953) identified such a 
nonlinear relation for the cost of storage in a study relating the spread 
between the spot price and the new-crop futures price to the level of 
wheat stocks at the end of the crop year. Subsequent studies have confirmed 
Working's findings for many other commodities. 
One reason for the negative marginal cost of storage at low levels 
of availability is that stocks have "convenience yield" or accessibility 
value to processors and other intermediate users, because either inflows or 
outflows are not predictable and the expected cost of running out is 
sufficiently high. For much the same reason people hold currency at the 
7cost of foregone interest. A related reason is that the cost of transport 
or transformation of stocks may rise as stocks fall, so that the net 
11arginal cost of storage becomes negative at low levels of stocks. This 
is observed, for example, in grain stocks held in barges. Because of the 
positive relation between barge speed and cost of transport, and the 
7 
negative relation between speed· and total floating inventory, at 
sµfficiently low levels of the latter a negative net marginal storage 
cost occurs. Thus some grain is found on barges even when prices are 
failling. 
To compare competitive and monopolistic storage, we use the following 
example. Suppose consumption demand has a constant elasticity of -0.2 
in every period, and the real interest rate, r, is constant at 5%. The .. 
harvest, supplied by atomistic competitive farmers, is h(l + vt) where .. 
vt is a serially uncorrelated disturbance, and his the same every period. 
Let vt have a five-point distribution of -20%, -10%, 0%, +10%, and +20% 
with probabilities .05, .20, .50, .20, and .05 respectively, a harvest 
sufficiently variable to provide considerable contrast between competitive 
and monopolistic storage. Define the market equilibrium with no uncertainty .. 
in the harvest as h • 100 tons, P • $100. Following the recent empirical 
study of Gray and Peck (1981) of the Chicago wheat market, we chose a 
piecewise linear functional form for marginal storage cost, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
The storage rules for both competition and monopoly derived 
numerically for this example are shown in Figure 2. Obviously monopoly has 
a dramatic effect on carryover behavior. The marginal propensity to store 
is greatly reduced, to less than one-half that of competitive storage, and 
8 
storage begins at a higher level of availability. 
Since this result is derived numerically, a simplified analytical 
example may help the reader to appreciate the underlying economic 
rationale. Consider a two-period case with a small perfectly anticipated 
production disturbance +Zin the first period, -z in the second. If planned .. 
production is fixed at h, a linear inverse demand function yields a first 
period price of 
8 
AA A 
(8} Pl• P(h) + Z h(l - s) P'(h) 
where s is the fraction of excess production stored in the first period
, 
Price in the secondand released from storage in the second period. 
period is 
AA A 
(9) P2 • P(h) - Z 
h(l - s)P'(h) 
The profit from storage, assuming no carrying charges or intere
st expenses 
is n • -(-ZsP1) + ZsP2 • Profit-maximizing m
onopolistic storage occurs at 
an
(10) is• Z2 hP'[2(2s - 1)) • O 
On the other hand under atomistic competitionThus s • 0.5. 
(11) 
Substituting from (8) and (9), the solution is s • 1.0 in th
is 
case. So the marginal propensity to store under monopoly is ha
lf that 
under competition. The difference in storage propensities in t
his simple 
exercise is similar to that seen in the results derived from ou
r numerical 
model, which is more realistic in that it has an infinite horiz
on, and the 
sequence of disturbances is not conveniently known in advance. 
Obviously at all levels of availability the monopolist holds le
ss 
than competitive storers. The common contrary presumption that
 a storage 
monopoly restricts the supply of grain during scarcities by exc
essive 
withholding follows plausibly from consideration of the static 
textbook case 
of the profit-maximizing behavior of a single firm with a finit
e and negative 
v 
9 
elasticity of demand for its product. The confusion arises over what the 
storage monopolist supplies. He does not extract his extra profits by 
keeping grain off the market to keep the price high but by restricting his 
output, his output being the provision of storage. A storer must, ignoring 
shrinkage, expect to sell at some point any grain he buys. The rule 
"buy low, hold high"•is no more conducive to success for a storage nomopolist 
than for a price-taker. Hence the true offense of a monopolistic storer 
is the exact reverse of the standard charge of over-withholding. The 
monopolist is not innocent because he withholds no more than competitive 
storers, as Adam Smith suggests, but guilty because he withholds too little 
at all levels of availability! 
This comparison of storage rules actually understates the case that 
a monopolist stores too little because it considers storage behavior at 
equal availabilities. But the amount available in one period depends in 
part on the storage in the previous period, and this means the monopolist's 
low storage will feed on itself. As an illustration of this cumulative effect, 
consider what a monopolist and an industry of competitive storers would be 
storing after a string of normal harvests (i.e., harvests when the disturbance 
is O). Both will reach a period when they store the same amo\lllt as in 
the previous period. For competitors this amount would be 9.1 tons, but 
for the monopolist only 2.2 tons. While this accumulation proceeds, 
consumption is actually higher under monopolistic storage than competitive 
storage. The advantage of competitive storage becomes clear only when a 
disastrous harvest interrupts the string of normal ones. Because of the extra 
stock available under competition, consumption is higher than llllder monopoly 
J 
10 
in these bad periods. The cumulative effect of monopoly on stocks can 
also be seen with the help of a simulation using a series of 7500 random draws 
for the disturbance in production. Under competition mean storage is 11.3 
tons while under monopoly it is only 4.5 tons. Not surprisingly the 
variability of price and consumption is considerably higher with monopoly. 
Under competition, standard deviations of consumption and price are 4.6 and 
29.2 respectively; the equivalent figures under monopoly are 7.9 and 48.0. 
4. An Alternative Cause for Excessive Withholding 
A monopolist's storage behavior is the opposite of that at 
which the ancient and modem prosecution of hoarders appears to be directed. 
But does this imply that such measures are misguided, or are there other 
reasons for such interventions in the private storage blarket? Although 
excessive withholding in times of scarcity is not consistent with monopoly, 
it.can occur under another distortion commonly found in grain markets 
ancient and modem, namely an implicit or explicit price ceiling. 
A price ceiling constrains the return storers can obtain for their 
holdings. If, as is usually the case, storers are "middle men" such 
as millers and shippers, then the price ceiling also puts a ceiling on 
the cost of their input into storage, or their shadow price of what they 
retain in inventory. Consequently they adjust their arbitrage conditions 
to reflect these distorted prices, and so change their storage behavior. 
To illustrate these responses, we considered the case where a ceiling 
of $112.50 is imposed. 
9 As Figure 2 shows, this price ceiling induces a 
significant change in competitive storage behavior - a positive amount 
is stored no matter how great the scarcity. 
11 
At last here is the kind of over-withholding during scarcity consistent 
with historical complaints and penalties. Why competitive storers retain some 
stocks during scarcities can be explained using Figure 3. The marginal 
return to a unit stored is the spread between the price expected in the next 
period, appropriately discounted, and the current market price. At 
any level of availability below 100.S tons, the ectnilibrium market spread, 
-$14.48, is equal to the marginal storage cost of 3.2 tons, this cost being 
negative because of the high convenience yield of that amount of storage. 
Because of this negative storage cost, private storers might as well hold 
grain as sell it in the current period at the price ceiling. Consequently, 
competitive storage is socially excessive below an availability of 96.8 tons, 
as can be seen in comparison with the "shadow spread" curve, calculated from 
the marginal social value of storage instead of the distorted market price. 
Above 96.8 tons availability, the shadow spread is above the market spread, 
and this implies private storage is deficient over that range. At very 
high levels of availability the possibility that the price ceiling might be 
hit in the next period becomes remote, so the social and private spreads 
converge. 
10 
5. Private Storage with Public Storage 
One way to prevent this sub-optimal private storage behavior would 
be simply to remove the price ceiling, which, besides distorting storage, 
also discourages production when it is responsive to price. Removing a 
price ceiling may be infeasible in practice, because of political pressure 
or because the ceiling confo:rms with the government's distributional 
objectives. Moreover, it may be impossible for the government to convince 
starers that it would never impose a price ceiling, since the government 
12 
is subject to no higher authority forcing it to keep its promises. A 
possible remedy for the distortions of price ceilings is direct participation 
in the storage activity. The types of public storage schemes frequently observed 
may prompt unusual behavior on the part of private storers because of the 
government's frequently arbitrary or inefficient formulation and operation 
of its rules. But even an efficient decentralized public storage authority 
whose managers use the shadow price of consumption P (the price of a 
tradeable ration coupon plus the market price) rather than the market price 
as their guide can induce competitive private storage that would likely be 
characterized as manipulative or monopolistic. 
To solve simultaneously for competitive private and public storage, 
it is necessary to obtain an equilibrium where both the public and private 
arbitrage conditions hold. For public storage: 
.. -1
P(I -sg - Sc) + K' (S8 ) ~ Et(Pt+l)[l + r] , sg • o t t t . g t t 
(12) 
P(I -sg - Sc) + K' (Sg) A -1 sg > o .· t t • Et(Pt+l)[l + r]t g t t' 
where K' represents the marginal cost of public storage. The private
g 
storers take the government's actions as given and follow: 
(13) 
-1(p ) (1 + r) ,= Et t+l 
where P denotes the distorted market price faced by private storers, 
and K' their net marginal storage costs. 
C 
13 
Because a public stockpile is not owned by processors, it may offer 
little or no convenience yield. Consequently the net marginal storage 
costs of private stocks may be below those of the public stockpile, and 
it is possible that private storers will hold some stocks even though the 
price ceiling depresses their return P relative to the "shadow incentive" 
...
P for government storage activity. Of course if there were no price 
ceiling, there would be only private storage under these circumstances. 
Because of the price ceiling and the interaction of public and 
private storage, withholding and even accumulation in a tight market might 
be rational for competitive storers. This can be illustrated with the 
numerical example used above, assuming that is constant at $2.50 
per period, and is the nonlinear function presented in Figure 1. 
The private and public storage rules, given a price ceiling of $112.50 
and these storage costs, are shown in Figure 4. The interaction of public 
and private storage is complex indeed. 
Government intervention increases total storage. Mean storage, public 
and private together, is 12.2 tons, while when private storage alone is 
allowed mean storage is 9.9 tons. (If there is no price ceiling, mean 
private storage is 11.3 tons.) But part of public storage simply replaces 
private storage. Mean public storage is 4.9 tons and this implies that on 
average 53 percent of public storage substitutes for private storage, the 
mean of which falls to 7.3 from 9.9 tons. This happens because over the 
higher availabilities, public storage depresses private storage. 
In times of scarcity, because of the anticipated public demand for 
grain to store in future periods, private storers can expect a higher 
14 
average market price for what they themselves store. When their alternative 
is selling at the price ceiling in the current period, this higher expected 
price induces them to hold even more off the market (at negative net storage 
cost) than if there were no public intervention in the storage activity. 
In Figure 2, private storage is 3.2 tons under the price ceiling, while in 
Figure 4 it is 4.1 tons. In short, government intervention exacerbates 
the excessive withholding of private starers when price is at the ceiling. 
But the presence of public storage introduces a new, dynamic 
dimension to appenrently perverse private storage behavior. Note that 
over a certain range of availabilities, private storage will actually be 
less than at extremely low amounts available. Figure 4 shows that if a 
poor harvest follows a normal one, and price rises, private storers may 
actually accumulate stocks even as a public authority is reducing its 
holdings. For example, if the availability was approximately 102.5 the 
previous period and is 95.1 this period, observed private storage would 
be higher now, although less of the commodity is available. Moreover, 
because price would also be higher, it might will be construed that 
private storers had manipulated the price. 
Of course, such seemingly perverse private market activity is partly 
an artifact of the particular storage costs and price ceiling. But this 
example is by no means unique. If the cost of storage at small amounts of 
storage were slightly less negative, private storage might even fall to 
nothing over a middle range of availabilities. Furthermore, if, as is 
generally the case, the government tried to defend a price band, rather than 
15 
adjust its storage continuously as market prices change, the private 
11 
reactions to such a crude policy could well seem even more perverse. 
On the other hand if the government attempted to take into account the 
private reaction to its own actions, that is, to act as a Stackelberg leader, 
a policy whose sophistication is beyond any observed public storage 
scheme, it can still induce seemingly perverse private behavior.
12 
A casual observer of this market could well be forgiven for 
inferring that private storage is collusive and manipulative. Although 
the diagnosis would be wrong, the natural prescription - action against 
boarding in times of scarcity - may well be socially desirable, despite 
the general disapproval of economists, as we now show. 
6. The Desirability of an Anti-Hoarding Policy 
Suppose an anti-hoarding law can be enacted that effectively liquidates 
private stocks whenever the price ceiling is reached. 
13 Such a law could 
14 
make a considerable improvement in social welfare. In this example, the 
present value of the dead-weight burden of the price ceiling amounts to 4.5% 
of the expenditure on the commodity in a typical period.
15 Prohibiting 
private storage at low levels of availability would reduce this dead-weight 
loss by 65% of the loss. Decentralized public storage, of the type 
considered above, without anti-hoarding laws, actually increases the welfare 
loss by 28% because of its perverse effect on private storage. 
16 
Given the 
price ceiling, the best of the policies considered is to combine public 
storage with anti-hoarding laws aimed at private storers. With that 
combination, 71% of the dead-weight loss can be recovered. 
16 
The rational use of anti-hoarding laws, of course, illustrates the 
general theory of the second best. It is reasonable to believe some other 
distortion, bad in its own right, might partly cancel out an initial 
distortion. Once price is controlled, public storage is a natural supple­
ment for deficient private stockholding. But public storage further 
distorts private storage; the addition of anti-hoarding laws moves the system 
closer to the first-best world of no distortions. 
7. Conclusion 
A storage monopoly in the grain market does not lead to excessive 
withholding in times of scarcity; rather it results in far too little 
carryover in both good and bad seasons. Thus,anti-hoarding laws do not 
address the problems caused by monopolistic practices. On the other hand, 
because carryover stocks can have negative net storage costs, competitive 
private storage behavior in the presence of a price ceiling may lead to 
excessive withholding in times of scarcity. Such private behavior, although 
competitive, may well appear collusive. This problem is exacerbated when 
the government operates a public stockpile to mitigate the effects of the 
price ceiling. In this case the private storers may appear even more 
socially undesirable, engaging in seemingly manipulative trading behavior, 
even though they actually remain price-takers. If an anti-hoarding law 
prevents privately rational but socially excessive private holdings during 
scarcities, it can improve social welfare. Thus, anti-hoarding laws may not 
be so akin to laws against witchcraft after all, even if their proponents are 
in error in believing that their social value comes from preventing 
monopolistic abuses. 
FOOTNOTES 
*This paper is based upon work supported by the National 
Science Foundation under Grant No. DAR-7910287. 
1niis offense was denoted "regrating," or could be included 
under wider charge "engrossing". An excellent description of the English 
laws regulating the corn trade is Gras (1915), especially Chapters V 
and VI. 
2For a descripton of these laws see Chaudhary (1974), Hamid 
(1974), Patel (1965), or Vyas and Bafna (1965). 
3Numerous recent examples of price controls are found in the 
literature on India and Pakistan referred to above. References to 
past British measures are found in Smith (1784), Vol. 2, pp. 298-310, 
Rashid (1980), Gras (1915~ and Barker (1920). In England prices 
were often indirectly controlled by allowing imports only above a 
certain price, or, when an export surplus developed, by prohibiting 
or taxing exports above a certain price. In the United States, the 
Nixon administration imposed a brief embargo on soybean exports in 
1973 to reduce domestic inflation of food prices. 
4The following transversality conditions (Samuelson (1971)) 
rule out infinite explosion of storage or expected price: 
Lim (1 + r)-T st = Lim (1 + r)-T EP • O
tT-+m r--
5
A description of the numerical approach is available from the 
authors. 
F2 
6See Stiglitz (1976), footnote 2. 
7For a discussion of accessibility in the context of inventory 
theory, see Williams (1980). 
8Further numerical results not reported here confirm that these 
conclusions about mnopoly would be the same if production were elastic, 
or the demand curve had a different shape (e.g. linear), or marginal 
storage costs were constant, although the exact storage rules would be 
slightly different. 
9In the undistorted case considered above, price exceeded 
$112.50 approximately 25% of the time, and mean price was $103.75. 
10In this example the price ceiling is deterministic. Even if the 
price ceiling is higher, or expected at a given price with some probability 
less than unity, qualitatively similar distortions of storage incentives 
will occur. 
1~xamples of apparently perverse private responses to arbitrary 
price band or price peg government stockpiling rules are found in 
Gardner (1979) and Salant (forthcoming). 
12we exaained a similar numerical example (available from the 
authors) in which we mdelled the government as a Stackelberg price 
leader constrained to choose a time-consistent storage rule. In 
that case we observed, as in Figure 4, excessive storage at the 
price ceiling, and private accumulation as prices rise to the ceiling, 
but in addition we observed a private aarginal propensity to store 
in excess of unity, and negative public marginal propensity to store, 
F3 
over a higher range of availabilities. For a discussion of Stackelberg 
public storage behavior and of the problems of deriving fully optimal 
public storage behavior in a distorted market see Wright and Williams 
(forthcoming 1982b). 
131n this particular example, a prohibition on hoarding during 
scarcities can be modelled by replacing the market price, P, with 
the shadow price P on the left hand side of the arbitrage conditions 
for competitive storage, when a price ceiling is in force. 
r14Social welfare is defined as the present value of expected surplus 
arising from current storage and all future harvests and storage. Assuming 
a low income elasticity of demand or a low budget share, this can be 
approximated (see Willig 1976) by the area under the consumption demand 
curve minus production costs, if any, and storage costs. Some of the 
benefits accrue because of additional storage subsequently. The expected 
social value of current and future consumption, SV, is a function of current 
storage. 
ht+l+st-5t+l 5t+l 
SV (St)• Et[ JP(C t) dC t - JK~(St+l (ht+l+St)) 
00 
.. 
where C(ht) is the cost of production, which is in this case zero 
because supply is perfectly inelastic. This function is derived, as is 
Et[Pt+l], by a process of successive numerical approximation. When there are 
no distortions,the marginal social value curve is the storage demand curve. 
F4 
15Tbe present value of the dead-weight loss of monopoly in the 
same example is approximately that of the price ceiling. The dead­
weight loss of a price ceiling if supply were responsive and affected 
by the ceiling would be considerably larger. 
16If the government acted as a Stackelberg price leader with time 
consistent behavior, welfare would be increased somewhat by public 
storage even without an anti-hoarding law. Nash public behavior would 
also improve welfare if supply were sufficiently elastic. 
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